US India Nuclear Deal and Political Lame Ducks

US India Nuclear Deal and Political Lame Ducks :
Dear All,
In my opinion, this certainly does not suggest a "lack of intellectual sophistication" as speculated by you.
The public reticence of the Indian PM all along has been very calculated.
And all along he has known clearly what he is doing.
If it were just so much, teams of British parliamentarians, Indian diaspora and Oxbridge graduates could have been airlifted to India on One Year lucrative academic contracts to offer crash sources in intellectual sophistication to Indian establishment.
It suggests merely the issue of the tail wagging the dog.
In the name of ill spelt out energy needs of India by the Oxbridge educated and World bank economists - it spells a predominance of economistic logic over basic political questions which still struggle to find elucidation in India.
ManMohan Singh and Montek Singh Ahluwalia are representative of Bretton Woods economists who have sought to smother legitimate political consensus.
Indeed the very logic of Nehruvian non alignment on a global stage has been disturbed due to a handful of economists turned politicians gaining ascendancy.
Mr Pranab Mukherjee's claims that India has not budged in its basic foreign policy objectives is very difficult to defend - indeed even he is now known for the hollow slogan of "bijli for aam aadmi " and "India's passport to nuclear trade", an industry purportedly of 100 billion dollars in the coming years.
The BJP led NDA, the other main opposition coalition is treading the same economic centralization doctrine and path though they claim that they still believe in the primary logic of the statement - "US is our natural ally ".
Whether the internal logic of the American military establishment and foreign policy will ever allow a stable and peaceful Middle Eastern and South Eastern Asia is an issue that BJP economic doctrinaires have not bothered to consider.

For this class of Indian elite, electoral success does not matter - they need control over the economic agenda - and for this they are CONTENT to LOSE political power in the states and regions of India, but SOMEHOW manage to RETAIN power at the centre in New Delhi in a curious mix of heavy handed American federal structure and British parliamentary democracy.
This central leverage is required by economists turned politicians to push through the economic agenda of rapid economic centralization in India without social equity.
It is also in this context that I judge the political immaturity of Prakash Karat and SitaRam Yechury in exiting the UPA coalition as against the political wisdom of Surjit Singh and Jyoti Basu, as regards the need for central leverage and fringe politics of the Left.
The US leaning Indian media almost forced out Prakash Karat from the UPA coalition in a well laid out trap.
In the present term, economic and intellectual reticence - as exemplified by the economists turned politicians at the helm in New Delhi - is the passport to economic heavy handedness and the preponderance of the economic elite over the political elite.

Regards,
Nagarjuna
-------------------------------
Indo-US nuclear deal

More embarrassing revelations have emerged.
The poor Indian PM, Manmohan Singh, has apparently failed to have grasped the fundamental provisions. Following the recent 26 pages of explanations provided by the Bush admin to the US Congress, Dr Brahma Chellaney (professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi) clarifies.

· The US has given no binding fuel-supply assurance to India. The Indian PM told the Lok Sabha on August 13, 2007 that 'detailed fuel supply assurances by the US for the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors are reflected in full' in the 123 Agreement’. But the Bush administration has denied this. Its letter to the House Committee states that the US will render help only in situations where 'disruptions in supply to India... result through no fault of its own,' such as a trade war or market disruptions. 'The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments, ' the letter said. The letter also reveals that the US has given no legally binding fuel-supply assurance of any kind.

· No US consent to India's stockpiling of lifetime fuel reserves for safeguarded power reactors. The prime minister had told the Lok Sabha on August 13, 2007 that, 'This Agreement envisages, in consonance with the Separation Plan, US support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply for the lifetime of India's reactors.' But the Bush administration' s letter to the House Committee makes clear that India will not be allowed to build such stocks as to undercut US leverage to re-impose sanctions.

· US civil nuclear cooperation is explicitly conditioned to India not testing ever again. The PM told the Lok Sabha as recently as July 22, 2008 that, 'I confirm that there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns. All that we are committed to is a voluntary moratorium on further testing.'

Last year, he had told Parliament that, 'There is nothing in the Agreement that would tie the hands of a future Government or legally constrain its options to protect India's security and defence needs.' The Bush administration, however, has told the House Committee that India has been left in no doubt that all cooperation will cease immediately if New Delhi conducted a test.

· The US has retained the right to suspend or terminate supplies at its own discretion. The Bush administration letter plainly contradicts the prime minister's assertion in Parliament on August 13, 2007 that, 'An elaborate multi-layered consultation process has been included with regard to any future events that may be cited as a reason by either Party to seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the (123) Agreement.' The letter states that the US right to suspend all supplies forthwith is unfettered.

· The letter makes clear that the 123 Agreement has granted India no right to take corrective measures in case of any fuel-supply disruption. Rather, India's obligations are legally irrevocable. It further indicates there is no link between perpetual safeguards and perpetual fuel supply. Contrast this with what the prime minister claimed in Parliament on August 13, 2007 : 'India's right to take "corrective measures" will be maintained even after the termination of the Agreement.' Or the prime minister's repeated assurances to Parliament since March 2006 that India 's acceptance of perpetual international inspections will be tied to perpetual fuel supply.

· The Bush administration' s letter states that the 123 Agreement fully conforms to the Hyde Act provisions. In a press release recently, the Prime Minister's Office made the following claim on July 2, 2008 : 'the 123 Agreement clearly overrides the Hyde Act and this position would be clear to anyone who goes through the provisions.'

· The letter assures Congress that the 'US government will not assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies. ' That rules out not only the transfer of civil reprocessing and enrichment equipment or technologies to India even under safeguards, but also casts a shadow over the US granting India operational consent to reprocess spent fuel with indigenous technology. Under the 123 Agreement, India has agreed to forego reprocessing until it has, in the indeterminate future, won a separate, congressionally vetted agreement.
On one issue, the 123 Agreement had held out hope for India in the future by stating in its Article 5(2) that, 'Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement.' But the Bush administration' s letter to Congress states that the US government had no plan to seek to amend the deal to allow any sensitive transfers.

Contrast this with what the prime minister said in Parliament on August 17, 2006 -- that ‘India wanted the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy, ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to reprocessing spent fuel. We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation as amplified above.'

Going by the above, poor India seems to have been roundly hoodwinked by the US lawyers. Does it suggest a lack of intellectual sophistication?
The nuclear deal might well prove to be India’s nemesis.

Eddie