So What Does Indian National Security Advisor Have to do with Harley Davidson MotorCycles ?

So What Does Indian National Security Advisor Have to do with Harley
Davidson MotorCycles ?

The Indian Prime Minister has been praised by Indian security
strategists as ... "the most liberal economist you can think of".
So now it seems India is embarking on a grand plan for building
highway infrastructure to accommodate American Harley Davidson
motorbicycles.
Wikileaks cables show us that the most hilarious conversations about
our Prime Minister seem to be happening under the haze of so many
disconnected topics.
It really would be hilarious, if only it were not so petty, that the
Indian Prime Minister should be lobbied, via the Indian National
Security Advisor, for the import into India, of Harley Davidson
motorcycles by top American diplomats.
Still more symptomatic is that the Indian Prime Minister is applauded
not for being a safe guardian of Indian trade interests or of Indian
agriculturists but for being someone who would be inclined to favour
the American lobbyists with reduced duties on oil guzzling monster
mobikes.
Incredible India and Incredible Indian politicians.
Nagarjuna

http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08NEWDELHI1489.html
http://twitter.com/wikileaks

Viewing cable 08NEWDELHI1489, NARAYANAN URGES BETTER BILATERAL
UNDERSTANDING ON
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NEWDELHI1489 2008-06-02 10:10 2011-02-01 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi

VZCZCXRO8644
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #1489/01 1541054
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021054Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1973
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1485
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6470


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001489

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL PTER KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
IR, PK
SUBJECT: NARAYANAN URGES BETTER BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING ON
TERRORISM TO SENATORS FEINGOLD AND CASEY Classified By: Ambassador
David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)

1.(C) Summary: National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan told Senators
Russ Feingold and Bob Casey May 30 that the U.S.-India relationship
amounts to much more than just trade links and defense deals, but
rather benefits from a mutual empathy. Asked about terrorism,
Narayanan related that training camps on the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border have attracted more "white faces." He also noted jihadi groups
have attempted to acquire fissile material and have the technical
competence to manufacture an explosive device beyond a mere dirty
bomb. Narayanan lamented that national intelligence agencies lack a
common understanding at a time when an incident such as the 2006
blasts in Mumbai involved planning and fundraising in up to 11
different countries. Regarding the May 13 blasts in Jaipur, Narayanan
divulged that India has narrowed the suspects to the Harkat-ul-Jihad
Islami (HUJI). On Iran, Narayanan asserted that India also wanted to
prevent a nuclear weapons program, but he criticized the use of
sanctions as ineffective, given the "unique" Shi'ite ability to absorb
punishment. Narayanan relayed the government's intention to maintain a
dialogue and normalize relations with Pakistan, as shown by the effort
to play down the increase in cross-border infiltration in recent
weeks. End Summary.

Motorcycles for Mangos - - -

2.(C) Senator Russ Feingold began the May 30 meeting with Senator Bob
Casey and National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan by urging a
reduction in tariffs on Harley Davidson motorcycles. Narayanan
responded that the Prime Minister is "the most liberal economist you
can think of," and he promised to pass the message to him and other
relevant officials.

U.S. and India Have Natural Empathy - - -

3.(C) Narayanan remarked that neither Senators Feingold and Casey have
traveled to India before, and he urged them to see more of the country
than Delhi. He described the U.S.-India relationship as much more than
trade links and defense deals, but enjoying a special "empathy" that
has increased as nearly every middle-class family has a relative in
the U.S. These ties will create a lasting relationship that, Narayanan
maintained, will not change.

The Role of NSA - - -

4.(C) Senator Feingold asked about the role of the National Security
Advisor and how Narayanan can pursue national security goals given the
decentralized nature of India's political system. Narayanan replied
that the government had revived the position of National Security
Advisor (NSA) in 1998 after a brief stint in 1990. The NSA, who
presides over the National Security Council, derives authority from
his association with the Prime Minister, a position that historically
has held great influence thanks to the legacy established by
Jawarharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, Narayanan explained. "In a sense,
I live in the shadow of the Prime Minister," he stated, which allows
him to cut across party loyalties and appeal to diverse interests.

Terrorism Challenge Requires Better Cooperation - - -

5.(C) Senator Feingold inquired about major security threats in the
region, and particularly Narayanan's thoughts on the May 13 Jaipur
blasts and Kashmir. Narayanan observed that the U.S. no longer ignores
terrorist attacks that occur in India because it has adopted a more
"cooperative angle" to face this common threat. He related that Indian
intelligence has detected various targets, including southern and
northeast Europe, Somalia and the Middle East, but not the U.S. Non-
state actors will intensify their asymmetric warfare, he predicted,
and pointed to the increase in "white recruits" detected by Indian
intelligence in terrorist training camps along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan borders. Those recruits will not be used against India or
Asian nations, he NEW DELHI 00001489 002 OF 003 pointed out, adding
that he has warned his counterparts of the development. He also
related that India has found a "manifest attempt to get fissile
material," though terrorist groups have not yet acquired any. However,
he warned, they have "enough physics to fabricate a crude bomb beyond
a dirty bomb."

6.(C) Narayanan perceived the lack of "adequate understanding" among
intelligence agencies as the greatest weakness in the war on terror.
"We keep our cards close to our chest, but it is extremely counter-
productive," he lamented, recognizing that the fault is "equally
shared." He cited the 2006 Mumbai blasts, which involved up to 11
countries, and at least seven distinct places where planning occurred.
He noted that he made the pitch during his visit to Washington for
greater information sharing, even of bits and pieces. "What might not
make sense to you might make sense to me," he pressed. He indicated
that he would raise intelligence sharing during the visit of the
upcoming visit of the Director of National Intelligence. He also
observed that jihadis no longer come from just the poorer segment of
the Muslim population, but rather from the upper crust of a community
that feels threatened in face of Muslim integration in India.

HUJI To Blame For Jaipur - - -

7.(C) Narayanan pinned the blame for the May 13 Jaipur explosions on
the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HUJI), a Bangladeshi offshoot of the
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), noting that HUJI also masterminded the August
2007 blasts in Hyderabad, which employed similar triggers, packaging
and devices as the Jaipur blasts. He noted that the Indian government
had focused on threats to Maharashtra and Gujarat, but had no
indication that Jaipur would be a target. No Nuclear Weapons, Nor
Sanctions, For Iran - - -

8.(C) Senator Casey expressed concern about the uranium enrichment
program in Iran and asked about India's policy on Iran's nuclear
program. Narayanan pointed out that India and Iran have enjoyed
civilizational links, India contains the second-largest Shi'ite
population in the world, and any event in Iran could impact India
because of their close geographic proximity. However, Narayanan
maintained, the Indian government has "bitten the bullet" and held the
view that Iran should abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), an unpopular position in India. During Iranian President
Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Delhi, the Prime Minister told him to
that India expects Iran to behave responsibly, Narayanan related.
However, Narayanan saw the U.S. and India diverging on the issue of
sanctions. He explained that the Shia clergy are more "sophisticated
and erudite" than their Sunni counterparts. At the same time, he
added, the Shia have a tremendous capacity to absorb punishment. "Self-
flagellation comes to them naturally," Narayanan commented. The
imposition of sanctions punishes ordinary people, who then turn their
anger outward, he said. Narayanan contended that encouraging Iran to
join the mainstream would produce more results. "We are cautious about
adhering to a broad attack on Iran, but we do not favor nuclear
weapons in Iran," Narayanan clarified.

India To Play Down Recent Infiltration from Pakistan - - -

9.(C) Senator Casey recounted his recent visit to Pakistan, where he
heard several promises about cracking down on border crossings. Should
the U.S. put stock in these pledges, he asked Narayanan. Narayanan
noted that under President Musharraf from 2004 to 2006, the Composite
Dialogue moved forward and infiltration dropped. The political crisis
in Pakistan in 2007 stalled progress, he noted. He said that he was
"hopeful" the new leadership would continue to see dialogue as useful,
and not just as "something that Musharraf did." The recent Foreign
Minister meetings in Islamabad helped ensure that the new government
would sustain the Composite Dialogue, Narayanan recounted. However, he
regretted that infiltration and incidents have spiked recently. He
related that the Indian government has played NEW DELHI 00001489 003
OF 003 them down and not lodged a formal protest, deciding instead to
treat them as a "temporary aberration." He remembered that hostility
between India and Pakistan had dropped to such an extent that Pakistan
had at one time withdrawn some of its military from the India-Pakistan
border in order to focus on the threats along the border with
Afghanistan, but those forces have since returned to the Indian
border.

Peace Deals With Terrorists - - -

10.(C) Asked by Senator Casey how India felt about the pacts signed
between the Pakistani Army and tribal groups, Narayanan replied that
the Indian government does not consider them conducive to peace.
Instead, he stated, "they are out-sourcing terror." He acknowledged
that the U.S. understands this stance, but the British seem to think
that the peace deals are a good move. Instead, Narayanan cautioned,
the deals will allow the tribal groups to re-energize by withdrawing
the pressure under which they might have relented. Pakistan needs its
army to hem those groups in, he stressed. Narayanan also advised the
U.S. to fight the war on the ground and avoid an air war, which he
doubted would work against tribal groups. Senator Feingold said that
he shared Narayanan's concerns about the peace agreements.

11.(C) Senator Feingold related that, during his May 28 visit to
Islamabad, Pakistanis refrained from using harsh words to describe
India. Warmer relations would be a new development for most Americans,
Senator Feingold noted. Narayanan recognized that the importance of
building a secure and stable Afghanistan has exposed the U.S. to
concerns that India has held for many years. This was an important
shift in the U.S., Narayanan asserted.

Comment: Pakistan Relations Remain Positive - - -

12.(C) A week after External Affairs Minister Mukherjee visited
Islamabad, the Indian government appears reassured by the new
Pakistani leadership's stated desire to sustain the dialogue that
Musharraf had maintained. Narayanan's description of the effort to
downplay the growth in incursions clearly aims to give the new
leadership in Islamabad breathing room. However, if India experiences
another attack on the scale of Jaipur or several more weeks of
heightened violence and infiltration activity on the border, the
pressure will mount on India to show its displeasure in public.

13.(SBU) This cable was cleared by Codel Feingold.
MULFORD

US India Nuclear Deal and Political Lame Ducks

US India Nuclear Deal and Political Lame Ducks :
Dear All,
In my opinion, this certainly does not suggest a "lack of intellectual sophistication" as speculated by you.
The public reticence of the Indian PM all along has been very calculated.
And all along he has known clearly what he is doing.
If it were just so much, teams of British parliamentarians, Indian diaspora and Oxbridge graduates could have been airlifted to India on One Year lucrative academic contracts to offer crash sources in intellectual sophistication to Indian establishment.
It suggests merely the issue of the tail wagging the dog.
In the name of ill spelt out energy needs of India by the Oxbridge educated and World bank economists - it spells a predominance of economistic logic over basic political questions which still struggle to find elucidation in India.
ManMohan Singh and Montek Singh Ahluwalia are representative of Bretton Woods economists who have sought to smother legitimate political consensus.
Indeed the very logic of Nehruvian non alignment on a global stage has been disturbed due to a handful of economists turned politicians gaining ascendancy.
Mr Pranab Mukherjee's claims that India has not budged in its basic foreign policy objectives is very difficult to defend - indeed even he is now known for the hollow slogan of "bijli for aam aadmi " and "India's passport to nuclear trade", an industry purportedly of 100 billion dollars in the coming years.
The BJP led NDA, the other main opposition coalition is treading the same economic centralization doctrine and path though they claim that they still believe in the primary logic of the statement - "US is our natural ally ".
Whether the internal logic of the American military establishment and foreign policy will ever allow a stable and peaceful Middle Eastern and South Eastern Asia is an issue that BJP economic doctrinaires have not bothered to consider.

For this class of Indian elite, electoral success does not matter - they need control over the economic agenda - and for this they are CONTENT to LOSE political power in the states and regions of India, but SOMEHOW manage to RETAIN power at the centre in New Delhi in a curious mix of heavy handed American federal structure and British parliamentary democracy.
This central leverage is required by economists turned politicians to push through the economic agenda of rapid economic centralization in India without social equity.
It is also in this context that I judge the political immaturity of Prakash Karat and SitaRam Yechury in exiting the UPA coalition as against the political wisdom of Surjit Singh and Jyoti Basu, as regards the need for central leverage and fringe politics of the Left.
The US leaning Indian media almost forced out Prakash Karat from the UPA coalition in a well laid out trap.
In the present term, economic and intellectual reticence - as exemplified by the economists turned politicians at the helm in New Delhi - is the passport to economic heavy handedness and the preponderance of the economic elite over the political elite.

Regards,
Nagarjuna
-------------------------------
Indo-US nuclear deal

More embarrassing revelations have emerged.
The poor Indian PM, Manmohan Singh, has apparently failed to have grasped the fundamental provisions. Following the recent 26 pages of explanations provided by the Bush admin to the US Congress, Dr Brahma Chellaney (professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi) clarifies.

· The US has given no binding fuel-supply assurance to India. The Indian PM told the Lok Sabha on August 13, 2007 that 'detailed fuel supply assurances by the US for the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors are reflected in full' in the 123 Agreement’. But the Bush administration has denied this. Its letter to the House Committee states that the US will render help only in situations where 'disruptions in supply to India... result through no fault of its own,' such as a trade war or market disruptions. 'The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments, ' the letter said. The letter also reveals that the US has given no legally binding fuel-supply assurance of any kind.

· No US consent to India's stockpiling of lifetime fuel reserves for safeguarded power reactors. The prime minister had told the Lok Sabha on August 13, 2007 that, 'This Agreement envisages, in consonance with the Separation Plan, US support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply for the lifetime of India's reactors.' But the Bush administration' s letter to the House Committee makes clear that India will not be allowed to build such stocks as to undercut US leverage to re-impose sanctions.

· US civil nuclear cooperation is explicitly conditioned to India not testing ever again. The PM told the Lok Sabha as recently as July 22, 2008 that, 'I confirm that there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns. All that we are committed to is a voluntary moratorium on further testing.'

Last year, he had told Parliament that, 'There is nothing in the Agreement that would tie the hands of a future Government or legally constrain its options to protect India's security and defence needs.' The Bush administration, however, has told the House Committee that India has been left in no doubt that all cooperation will cease immediately if New Delhi conducted a test.

· The US has retained the right to suspend or terminate supplies at its own discretion. The Bush administration letter plainly contradicts the prime minister's assertion in Parliament on August 13, 2007 that, 'An elaborate multi-layered consultation process has been included with regard to any future events that may be cited as a reason by either Party to seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the (123) Agreement.' The letter states that the US right to suspend all supplies forthwith is unfettered.

· The letter makes clear that the 123 Agreement has granted India no right to take corrective measures in case of any fuel-supply disruption. Rather, India's obligations are legally irrevocable. It further indicates there is no link between perpetual safeguards and perpetual fuel supply. Contrast this with what the prime minister claimed in Parliament on August 13, 2007 : 'India's right to take "corrective measures" will be maintained even after the termination of the Agreement.' Or the prime minister's repeated assurances to Parliament since March 2006 that India 's acceptance of perpetual international inspections will be tied to perpetual fuel supply.

· The Bush administration' s letter states that the 123 Agreement fully conforms to the Hyde Act provisions. In a press release recently, the Prime Minister's Office made the following claim on July 2, 2008 : 'the 123 Agreement clearly overrides the Hyde Act and this position would be clear to anyone who goes through the provisions.'

· The letter assures Congress that the 'US government will not assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies. ' That rules out not only the transfer of civil reprocessing and enrichment equipment or technologies to India even under safeguards, but also casts a shadow over the US granting India operational consent to reprocess spent fuel with indigenous technology. Under the 123 Agreement, India has agreed to forego reprocessing until it has, in the indeterminate future, won a separate, congressionally vetted agreement.
On one issue, the 123 Agreement had held out hope for India in the future by stating in its Article 5(2) that, 'Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement.' But the Bush administration' s letter to Congress states that the US government had no plan to seek to amend the deal to allow any sensitive transfers.

Contrast this with what the prime minister said in Parliament on August 17, 2006 -- that ‘India wanted the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy, ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to reprocessing spent fuel. We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation as amplified above.'

Going by the above, poor India seems to have been roundly hoodwinked by the US lawyers. Does it suggest a lack of intellectual sophistication?
The nuclear deal might well prove to be India’s nemesis.

Eddie